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At the beginning of September 2015, shocking images of a drowned Syrian refugee boy on a 
Turkish beach aroused widespread criticism of European policy. Although the crisis had 
started much earlier, many people apparently only then formed the belief that it is the moral 
obligation of rich Europe to take care of people in desperate need, and demanded politicians 
to act. Why? Speaking for myself, as a parent of a boy of similar age, I felt sadness and 
anger at those responsible for forcing parents to take such risks – I couldn’t help thinking 
that this could have happened to my own son, had I not had the luck to live in a stable and 
peaceful country. The striking picture resonated emotionally with me, as it did with many 
others who had hitherto paid little attention to the refugee problem, in spite of knowing that 
large numbers of people were risking their lives to escape war. The best explanation for this 
reaction is likely to be the capacity and tendency of human beings to take on the feelings 
they attribute to other people, when they come to be vividly aware of the situation of 
individual others they can identify with. Evidently, such empathic feelings sometimes 
causally influence the moral judgments that people make. 
This modest claim about causal influence is hardly controversial. But some 
philosophers have made stronger claims for empathy, maintaining that it is necessary for or 
even constitutive of moral judgment, or that it is part of the best explanation of why we 
endorse pro-social moral norms and distinguish them from conventional norms. Some have 
also argued that empathy is needed for making good moral judgments, while others claim 
it’s often morally problematic, because it is biased and insensitive to numbers, among other 
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things. This chapter examines arguments for and against such claims, focusing largely on the 
contemporary debate, though I will discuss the historical views that have directly influenced 
it.  
 
1. Empathy Causation 
In keeping with established terminology, I will distinguish between cognitive and affective 
empathy, where the former is roughly a matter of imaginatively taking another’s perspective, 
and the latter involves roughly coming to feel as the other does, because one takes the other 
to feel that way. (I will leave the details of these processes for other chapters.) Here’s a 
simple form of the hypothesis that empathy is causally necessary for moral judgment: 
 Minimal Empathy Causation Hypothesis 
Any moral judgment made by any subject B regarding a situation that elicits emotion 
or affect in another subject A is caused at least in part by affective empathy with A. 
 
If Minimal Empathy Causation is true, we can’t make moral judgments concerning others 
without first empathizing with someone. (As Jesse Prinz (2011a) points out, it is silent on 
judgments concerning oneself.) Why would this be? One classical argument is provided by 
David Hume (whose own view is nevertheless ultimately more complex, as we’ll see). Hume 
argues, first, that what makes us approve or disapprove of something is that surveying it 
gives rise to a distinctive kind of pleasure or pain (T 78). In the case of moral judgment, he 
maintains that “’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to our 
particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good 
or evil.” (T 79) Second, something pleases or pains us without reference to our particular 
interest only when we empathize with the pleasure or pain it gives rise to in others. Using 
“sympathy” for what is now called empathy, he summarizes: “When any quality, or 
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character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we are pleas’d with it, and approve of it; 
because it presents the lively idea of pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy, and is 
itself a kind of pleasure.” (T 155) This suggests that empathy is causally necessary for 
(other-directed) moral judgment, since it alone enables us to have the distinctive kind of 
disinterested pleasure or pain on which moral approbation or disapprobation is based. This is 
a parsimonious hypothesis, as it allows us to explain why people make the moral judgments 
they do without appeal to some kind of innate moral capacity, intuition, or practical reason. 
(Hume and other sentimentalists separately argue against these alternative explanations, but 
this is not the place to discuss these arguments.) 
 Nevertheless, Minimal Empathy Causation faces such serious challenges that it has 
few if any defenders. Leaving aside issues that arise for sentimentalist explanations in 
general, Hume himself observed that our empathy can vary without variation in our moral 
judgment. For example, he noted that like sense perception, our natural empathy is 
influenced by the position of the object relative to us: “We sympathize more with persons 
contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with 
strangers: With our countrymen, than with foreigners.” (T 156) Yet our approval doesn’t 
(always) vary accordingly. Hume’s explanation of this was that we learn to regulate our 
empathy when making judgments. That is, we “correct the momentary appearances” (T 157) 
by adopting a “common point of view” (T 163), since otherwise our sentiments would 
constantly clash and uncertainty would reign. We do this “by a sympathy with those, who 
have any commerce with the person we consider” (T 158). So it is not enough that empathy 
helps us transcend our own perspective in some way. For Hume, our moral verdicts depend 
on empathizing with the feelings of those affected by an action (or the agent’s character 
traits) regardless of their relationship to us. Call this kind of view the Regulated Empathy 
Causation hypothesis. 
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 Adam Smith’s account builds on Hume’s, but highlights the role of cognitive 
empathy. He believes that what leads us to approve of someone’s response to a situation is 
that we imaginatively place ourselves in their shoes and find that we would respond the same 
way. His account of moral judgment is complex, but roughly, he claims that we morally 
disapprove of someone if we imaginatively place ourselves in the shoes of both the agent 
and those affected, and find that we would ourselves resent the agent for the ill will her 
action displays (see Gordon 1995 and Kauppinen 2010). Like Hume, Smith thinks we learn 
to regulate our response, in his case by reference to how an impartial spectator would feel. 
An impartial spectator is just any normal person who doesn’t favor any particular person, so 
that her responses are not influenced by the identity of the agent or the patient of the action, 
and who doesn’t think of herself as more important than others. When I approach a situation 
as an impartial spectator, I feel just the same way about an insult to a stranger as I do about 
an insult to a friend, and I take it that any ordinary person who treats others as equals would 
feel the same way. It is the sense that any normal, decent person who doesn’t take sides 
would feel in a certain way that lends a distinctively moral force and quality to our sentiment. 
So, Hume and Smith agree that making moral judgments on the basis of empathy 
involves counteracting some of our natural tendencies. In contemporary terms, it demands a 
form of emotion regulation: we need to both up-regulate our empathic reaction on behalf of 
strangers and down-regulate our empathic reaction on behalf of those close to us (see 
Kauppinen 2014 for discussion with reference to empirical psychology). However, while this 
kind of view explains why natural empathy and our moral judgments diverge, it is hardly 
credible as a hypothesis about the causal history of each and every moral judgment. The 
problem is that it is cognitively quite demanding to place ourselves impartially in another’s 
position before judging, and we certainly seem capable of making judgments without doing 
so.  
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 Even if we leave the above issues aside, it is questionable whether empathizing could 
account for the content of all our moral judgments. As Jesse Prinz has emphasized, there are 
many situations in which we make moral judgments, but there is no possibility of empathic 
affective reaction. For example, there seem to be victimless crimes, which we disapprove of 
even though there is by definition no one to empathize with. Many people disapprove of 
masturbating with an already dead chicken, for example (Haidt, Koller, and Diaz 1996). In 
yet other cases, there are too many victims to empathize with (think of the Great Famine), or 
it is indeterminate who suffers from the bad action, such as tax evasion (Prinz 2011a, 220). 
These cases strongly suggest that empathy can’t be causally necessary for moral judgment. 
Indeed, they support a simpler explanation, which Prinz puts as follows: 
My moral response is linked to action-types. If I classify your behavior as an instance 
of “stealing,” then that is enough to instill moral ire. Disapprobation can follow 
directly from certain types of action without any need to contemplate the suffering of 
victims. (2011a, 220) 
 
This simple alternative hypothesis appears to be superior to any Empathy Causation account. 
But it requires an answer to the question of how we come to disapprove of actions of certain 
types, and there empathy might yet have a role to play.  
 
2. Empathy Constitution 
Could empathy be constitutively involved in each and every moral judgment? If it were, the 
following would be true. Here is the thesis: 
Empathy Constitution 
Moral judgments are constituted by affective empathy either with the patient or the 
agent of the action. 
 6 
 
In its patient-focused form, Empathy Constitution is vulnerable to many of the challenges 
faced by Empathy Causation, or their analogues. For example, if we consider ourselves to be 
wronged, but can’t empathize with ourselves, clearly our judgment isn’t constituted by our 
empathic emotion. How about the agent-focused variant? It has recently been defended by 
Michael Slote. Slote begins by observing that “empathic concern for others is itself a 
psychological state that may be the subject or object of empathy” (Slote 2010, 34). Suppose 
that someone goes out of their way to help the homeless, thus manifesting a high degree of 
empathic concern. In Slote’s terminology, she displays warmth and tenderness towards the 
homeless. If I come to share her feelings, I feel warmth and tenderness towards her, and such 
“empathy with empathy” constitutes moral approval (ibid., 35). On the other hand, if 
someone acts towards others with cold indifference, taking on that person’s feeling means 
that I have a cold feeling towards the agent, and that constitutes my disapproval, according 
to Slote. Such emotional approval and disapproval then “enters into making moral 
judgments” (53), which helps explain why moral judgments coincide with motivation.  
Many philosophers have criticized Slote’s proposal (see e.g. Stueber 2011). One 
problem that I’ll leave aside here is a more general metaethical issue of whether moral 
judgments could consist even in part in feelings of any kind, given their semantic and 
inferential properties. Apart from this issue, one obvious concern is that if I take on your 
warm feeling towards the homeless, I seem to end up with a warm feeling towards the 
homeless, not towards you. Slote’s response to this is to claim that the intentionality of the 
empathic feeling is determined by its causal origin, which is the agent’s feeling (2010, 39). 
But this view of the intentionality of empathic emotions has odd implications. Suppose 
you’re angry with Eilis, and I empathize with you. Since the cause of my empathic anger is 
your feeling, Slote’s view implies that I’m now angry with you! This is unacceptable. 
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Second, feelings of warmth or chill towards someone seem to have very different 
characteristics than moral approval or disapproval (Prinz 2011a). For example, while feeling 
cold toward someone is no doubt a negative feeling, it only accidentally motivates us to 
impose sanctions on the agent. It contrasts with blaming attitudes like resentment or 
indignation, which are hardly phenomenally ‘cold’ in any sense. Finally, agential empathy 
seems to be neither sufficient nor necessary for approval, nor its absence for disapproval. For 
example, we can disapprove of actions that are not done out of unempathic motives, such as 
an animal rights activist throwing a cake in the face of a politician out of empathy for the 
suffering of farm animals (cf. D’Arms 2011). In short, neither the patient- nor the agent-
focused variant of Empathy Constitution is particularly plausible. 
 
3. Empathy’s Role in Explaining Moral Norms 
Given the challenges to Empathy Causation and Empathy Constitution, one might think that 
empathy can’t play a role in explaining moral judgment. But what has been said so far 
doesn’t yet rule out a more indirect, yet still necessary role for empathy in the development 
of moral judgment. Consider Prinz’s hypothesis that “moral response is linked to action-
types” (2011a, 220). As I noted, it requires an explanation of how such a link is formed.  
That is, why do we embrace certain specific moral norms or rules, and why do we regard 
certain norms as specifically moral, as opposed to conventional? Here’s one hypothesis:  
 Empathy Explanation Hypothesis 
Empathic feelings are a necessary part of the best explanation of a) why subjects 
endorse pro-social norms b) in a distinctively moral way. 
 
By ‘pro-social norms’ I mean norms that prohibit harming other people in certain contexts, 
require respecting people and their property, demand fair treatment, and so on. Not all norms 
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that people have historically endorsed in a distinctively moral way are pro-social in this 
sense. Obviously, practices like slavery or marital rape have been considered morally 
permissible, and some people think chauvinistic patriotism is morally required. The best 
explanation for the existence of such norms will likely appeal to the self-interest of 
privileged populations rather than empathy. But empathy might play a role in explaining 
why people hold some central moral norms, even when it is against their self-interest or what 
they’ve been taught. 
 
3.1 Empathy and Rules 
The first part of the Empathy Explanation hypothesis is that empathy is necessary for 
explaining why people form judgments regarding certain pro-social act-types. There’s 
several ways in which this explanation might work. Hume and Smith appealed to what might 
be called our induction disposition: once we perceive a pattern across cases, we project it to 
future instances as a generalized expectation. As Smith puts it: 
The general maxims of morality are formed, like all other general maxims, from 
experience and induction. We observe in a great variety of particular cases what 
pleases or displeases our moral faculties, what these approve or disapprove of, and, 
by induction from this experience, we establish those general rules. (TMS 377) 
 
It is, as I said, relatively uncontroversial that we do sometimes form judgments as a result of 
empathizing with someone. Suppose that during our formative years, we encounter several 
people who have been cheated by someone else, empathize with their anger or hurt, and 
consequently disapprove of the people who cheated them. (Insofar as we empathize 
impartially, we’ll disapprove of cheating anyone, not just cheating people like us.) If we 
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have the induction disposition, we’ll come to disapprove all instances of cheating by default, 
without having to empathize in each and every case of cheating.  
A different but potentially complementary kind of empathy-based explanation says 
that over time, we (collectively) come to embrace pro-social moral norms out of a set of 
candidates, because those norms resonate with our empathic tendencies. Individuals might 
then pick up these norms through socialization without themselves empathizing. This would 
be an empathy-based variant of the view that Shaun Nichols (2004) has developed, 
according to which norms that match our affective reactions enjoy greater “cultural fitness” 
than those that don’t, and thus get transmitted from generation to generation. Nichols’s own 
account appeals to a “Concern Mechanism”, which is triggered by attributions of negative 
hedonic or affective states to others, and generates concern for them, reactive distress, and 
contagious distress (2004, chapter 2). It is these emotional responses that explain why norms 
against causing harm to others are widely adopted, according to Nichols. However, our 
actual pro-social moral norms are much more complex than blanket prohibitions against 
harming people – it matters to us what the agent’s motives are, whether the harm is a means 
to an end or a side effect, whether the harm is the result of an action or of an omission, 
whether the harm is intended, negligent, or merely accidental, and so on (for some empirical 
data, including data about cultural variation, see Young and Tsoi 2013 and Barrett et al. 
2016). Arguably, a simple Concern Mechanism cannot account for the greater cultural 
fitness of such norms that are sensitive to the agent’s quality of will. Instead, explaining 
them may require appealing to perspective-taking along the lines of the regulated empathy 
hypothesis (see Kauppinen forthcoming for some details). 
 How successful is this part of Empathy Explanation? Properly answering this 
question would require a detailed comparison with alternative explanations of why we 
embrace pro-social moral norms. While philosophers sometimes appeal to the ability to 
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intuit moral principles or pure practical reason, psychologists tend to prefer evolutionary 
explanations that appeal to innate affective dispositions to disapprove of behavior that 
reduces fitness at the group level (Haidt 2012) or an innate moral ‘grammar’ that generates 
moral principles (Mikhail 2011). Jesse Prinz (2011a, 2011b) offers parental conditioning and 
imitation as an alternative. However, such a story is evidently incomplete, since it leaves 
unexplained why parents endorse and transmit some norms and not others. In any case, if 
any of these hypotheses is true, empathy is not necessary for explaining our adherence to our 
moral norms. What Empathy Explanation has going for it is parsimony, since it doesn’t 
require assuming any kind of innate moral capacity (see Nichols 2005). It also predicts that 
empathic reactions to novel situations will result in specification or rejection of pre-existing 
principles (Masto 2015) – for example, we might come to rethink our convictions regarding 
slavery or treatment of refugees as a result of vivid descriptions that arouse empathic 
feelings. 
 
2.2 Empathy and the Moral/Conventional Distinction 
The second part of Empathy Explanation is that empathy is necessary for explaining why we 
regard certain pro-social norms as distinctively moral. Clearly, not all norms belong in this 
category. We can, for example, think that something is against the law without thinking that 
it is morally wrong. What is distinctive of moral norms, then? Since the work of Elliot Turiel 
(1983), it has been common for psychologists to focus on different ways of responding to 
transgressions of norms. According to this tradition, some transgressions are regarded as 
wrong independently of whether they are permitted by social, political, or even religious 
authorities (authority-independence), as wrong everywhere (universality), as more seriously 
wrong (seriousness), and more severely punishable. These norm-violations include what are 
often considered paradigmatic moral wrongs, such as injustice or harming others. Other 
 11 
transgressions, such as dressing in a particular way, are regarded as wrong only when 
prohibited by some local authority, such as a teacher, legislator, or custom, wrong only 
locally, as less seriously wrong, and less severely punishable. These features are taken by 
many psychologists to mark what is called the moral/conventional distinction. Many studies 
have found that children distinguish between these two kinds of transgression from an early 
age, roughly 2 to 3 years old (Smetana 1981). Although this distinction has recently become 
controversial (see Kelly et al. 2007 and Shoemaker 2011), the critiques arguably misconstrue 
what authority-independence in the relevant sense entails, so I will assume in the following 
that it is nevertheless along the right lines. (Space constraints prevent a more detailed 
examination here.) 
 Supposing this is the right way to draw the moral/conventional distinction, what 
could be the role of empathy in explaining it? Start with the contrast between a paradigmatic 
moral transgression that involves one person deliberately harming another in order to further 
their own perceived interests, and a paradigmatic conventional violation, such as wearing 
different colored socks. In the first case, if we either affectively empathize with the person 
harmed, or imaginatively put ourselves in her position, we will predictably have a negative 
reactive attitude such as resentment towards the agent. Typically, at least as far as we 
ourselves see it, this attitude doesn’t depend on our personal relationship to either the agent 
or the patient, or on taking ourselves to be more important than other people, so we take it 
that any normal, decent person would feel the same way. Consequently, we emotionally 
construe the action as being wrong, whether or not we’ve been told by someone that it is 
impermissible (see Kauppinen 2013). Further, we’re in a position to appreciate why the 
action is wrong – say, that it manifests insufficient regard for the victim’s will or interests. 
And when we have a negative reactive attitude towards the agent, we’re already blaming 
them, and if we take it that any informed and impartial spectator would feel the same way, 
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we already construe blame as fitting. In the second case, we won’t have these emotional 
responses towards different colored socks. So even if both harming and dressing in a certain 
way go against rules that we’ve been taught, it’s no surprise that we regard the first violation 
to have a different status, and consider it to be wrong regardless of whether someone in a 
position of authority permits it. 
These considerations suggest that empathizing of a certain kind is sufficient to 
distinguish moral from conventional norms. It’s a much more demanding task to make that 
empathy is necessary for recognizing the distinction. One challenge is that other emotional 
responses, such as disgust, seem sufficient to get some people to regard certain 
transgressions, such as masturbating with a dead animal or spitting into a glass from which 
one is going to drink, as authority-independently wrong (Nichols 2004). One line of 
response would be to emphasize that authority-independence isn’t the sole mark of a moral 
norm. There’s also the fittingness of blame and guilt. A defender of Empathy Explanation 
might insist that when we think that a disgusting behavior is morally wrong, there is an 
element of cognitive empathy involved in our disapproval – we imagine any normal person 
would blame the agent for such behavior. It would support this hypothesis if people who 
lack empathy couldn’t genuinely distinguish between moral and conventional violations. I’ll 
turn to this issue next. 
 
2.3 Empathy Deficits and Moral Judgment 
Empathy Explanation predicts that people with empathy deficits should manifest deficient 
moral judgment. (I will restrict my attention to judgment, not moral agency in general). In 
this context, two populations, psychopaths and autists, have received particular attention. In 
the following, it is worth bearing in mind that both conditions are spectrum disorders – any 
deficits associated with them can be expected to be a matter of degree. 
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 Let’s start with psychopaths. One characteristic of the disorder is that psychopaths 
care little or nothing about how other people feel. Nevertheless, psychopaths appear to be 
good at attributing feelings to others, possibly by way of perspective-taking. Thus, they seem 
to be deficient in affective empathy in particular, and seemingly a good test case for its 
necessity for moral judgment. Are psychopaths capable of moral judgment, then? This is 
controversial. They do well in some tests of moral reasoning, and generally classify as 
wrong the same actions as normal people do. But since they appear to be unmoved by the 
wrongness of certain actions, some philosophers deny that they genuinely consider them to 
be morally wrong – rather, they’re only parroting what they’ve been taught. Whether this is 
the case hangs on whether moral judgment internalism is true or not (for the current state of 
the debate, see Björnsson et al. (eds.) 2015).  
A metaethically more neutral test is whether psychopaths can distinguish between 
moral and conventional violations. Some evidence suggests that they can’t – in particular, 
one study found that convicted criminal psychopaths say all transgressions are authority-
independently wrong (Blair 1995). R. J. R. Blair’s (1995) interpretation is that psychopaths 
can’t tell the difference between moral and conventional norms since they lack an affective 
response to the suffering of others (so, unsurprisingly, they rarely appeal to harm as a 
justification for why a violation is wrong), but try to create a good impression in the eyes of 
authorities by erring on the side of caution and classifying all violations as authority-
independent. However, more recent studies suggest that psychopaths may, after all, be able 
to make the distinction. For example, when Aharoni et al. (2012) gave a forced-choice test, 
in which subjects had to classify 8 out of 16 transgressions as authority-independent, they 
“found no evidence that high-psychopathy offenders—as measured by total psychopathy 
score—were any poorer at distinguishing moral from conventional transgressions than were 
low-psychopathy offenders.” However, total psychopathy score includes a number of 
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components, such as interpersonal and lifestyle facts, in addition to affect, and they found 
that the affective facet taken alone did influence performance. (For an alternative 
interpretation of the data, see Levy 2014.) 
 In brief, then, evidence from psychopaths must be regarded as inconclusive at the 
moment. Matters are further complicated by the fact that psychopaths suffer from other 
deficits as well. Prinz (2011a) argues that their generally low affect levels suffice to explain 
any deficiencies in moral judgment, while Jeanette Kennett (2002) argues that it is problems 
with reasoning and impulse control that are the cause – in particular, she claims psychopaths 
are unable to appreciate how considerations independent of one’s present desires provide 
reasons that extend over time (2002, 355). In the latter vein, Heidi Maibom draws on various 
empirical studies to support the hypothesis that psychopaths have deficient practical 
rationality in the sense of willing means to their ends and ensuring that their aims are 
consistent, among other things, due to “impairments in attention width and span, impulsivity, 
deficient self-understanding, and difficulties adjusting their responses” (Maibom 2005, 253–
254).  
However, Aaltola (2014) observes that so-called secondary psychopaths are ‘hot-
headed’ and aggressive, though not empathic, so Prinz’s hypothesis doesn’t seem to work for 
them. In contrast, primary psychopaths are extremely controlled and intelligent, while being 
emotionally detached and fearless. These ‘snakes in suits’, as they’re sometimes called, 
don’t seem to have the problems with reason that Kennett’s and Maibom’s hypotheses 
require (although such individuals have not yet been studied as carefully as incarcerated 
psychopaths). So it seems empirically plausible that it is the common problem with both 
kinds of psychopath, lack of empathy, which best explains the deficits in their moral 
judgment. But any definite conclusions would be premature. 
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 Autistic people are another population of interest, since, roughly speaking, it is 
characteristic of them that they can’t adopt the perspective of others, and thus rate low on 
cognitive empathy. At the same time, autists are often conscientious, and both autistic 
children (Leslie et al. 2006) and adults (Zalla et al. 2011) distinguish between moral and 
conventional norms. Kennett concludes from these facts that “the case of autism shows that 
both selves and moral agents can be created in the absence of empathy” (2002, 357). But this 
conclusion, too, may be premature. Many researchers believe that autists are capable of 
affective empathy, even if they are bad at mindreading (Dziobek et al. 2008), so a version of 
Empathy Explanation might still be true (Blair 2005). However, there is at least some reason 
to think that autism involves deficient affective empathy as well. Hobson and Hobson (2014) 
draw on various studies to argue that since the cognitive deficits of autists make it hard for 
them to experience others as persons with minds in the first place, the range, depth, and 
likelihood of their emotional response to the feelings or situations of others is severely 
limited. 
 Adding to the complexity of the issue, some recent research has called into question 
the assumption that autists are capable of making the moral/conventional distinction. In 
particular, Zalla et al. (2011) gave autistic subjects not only questions regarding standard 
moral and conventional violations, but also disgust violations drawn from Nichols (2004). 
What they found was that while normal subjects regarded moral and disgust violations as 
authority-independent, they nevertheless distinguished between them. But autists didn’t. 
They also rarely appealed to the welfare of the victim to justify their judgment in moral 
cases. Other studies have shown that autists’ violation judgments aren’t as sensitive to 
agent’s intentions as normal subjects’ judgments – roughly, they judge unintended harms to 
be as bad as deliberate harms (Moran et al. 2011, Buon et al. 2013). These results are 
unsurprising – given the trouble autists have in putting themselves in other people’s shoes, 
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they can be expected to have difficulty appreciating the moral significance of the agent’s and 
patient’s perspective on an action. On the basis of such considerations, Tiziana Zalla and co-
authors conclude: 
We argue that while the affective component of the empathy is sufficient to 
distinguish affect-backed from affect-neutral norms, an intact cognitive empathy, 
which is specifically involved in moral appraisal, is required to distinguish moral 
from disgust violations. (Zalla et al. 2011, 123) 
This is good news for Empathy Explanation, since it suggests that cognitive empathy may 
after all be necessary for being able to properly make the moral/conventional distinction, 
possibly by way of making possible more cognitively demanding forms of affective empathy.  
 To sum up, although the empirical evidence regarding psychopathy and autism is 
controversial, it seems plausible that while members of both empathy deficient populations 
may be capable of distinguishing between moral and conventional violations in at least some 
cases, they have a poor grasp of the grounds for authority-independent rules for blaming 
people (cf. McGeer 2008 and Shoemaker 2015). This suggests that both cognitive empathy 
and affective response to putting oneself in the shoes of others may be necessary for moral 
insight and perhaps moral intuition. This more modest hypothesis predicts that empathy 
deficient people, regardless of their reasoning capacity, will be poor at making moral 
judgments when moral insight is needed – in particular, when the rules that one has learned 
from others don’t yield an answer, or yield answers that conflict with one another. While it 
has not, to my knowledge, been empirically tested yet, this hypothesis does fit well with 
observed behavior. 
 
4. Is Empathy Good or Bad for Moral Judgment? 
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Regardless of how empirical controversies regarding the causal or explanatory role of 
empathy turn out, we can ask whether empathizing with others before making moral 
judgments makes it more likely that those judgments are correct. In one kind of situation, 
this is the case rather trivially. The correctness of some moral judgments hangs on facts 
about the feelings and other psychological states of other people. For example, whether 
Emily is to blame for hurting Joe’s feelings depends in part on what Emily’s intentions were 
and whether Joe’s feelings were indeed hurt. Assuming that cognitive empathy is one way of 
learning about other people’s intentions and feelings, it will in such cases be conducive to 
making correct judgments. Further, we occasionally ask each other to “walk a mile in our 
shoes” before blaming us. In this kind of case, too, cognitively empathizing with someone is 
likely to change our moral responses for the better – typically, it leads us to better appreciate 
the presence of excusing factors. (The data from autists supports this hypothesis.) So, in brief, 
cognitive empathy with the agent or those affected by an action can be expected to improve 
moral judgment whenever the moral status of the action depends on empirical facts about 
mental states that are accessible via empathy. 
 But what if our moral judgments result from affective empathy with the actual 
feelings of other people? Is that a good thing? It is a commonsense notion that empathy 
serves as a check to bias and self-interest, so we should try to be more empathic if we can 
before we judge. But recently, some philosophers and psychologists have argued that 
empathy is inherently morally problematic. Paul Bloom (2013) maintains that it is “parochial, 
narrow-minded, and innumerate”, so we shouldn’t rely on it. He notes that psychological 
research has revealed what is called the identifiable victim effect: people seem to care more 
about the plight of one individual they can relate to than about the suffering of many people 
that shows up in statistics (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997). Indeed, we can’t possibly 
empathize with everyone, and people who are strangers to us might be particularly difficult 
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for us to empathize with, so we’re better off relying instead on “more abstract principles of 
justice and fairness, along with a more diffuse compassion” (Bloom 2015). Sometimes this 
means going against empathy’s verdict, as when punishment is warranted, or fair allocation 
of resources means that someone has to suffer. Jesse Prinz (2011a, 2011b) makes similar 
criticisms, adding that empathy is easily manipulated (for discussion and a response to Prinz, 
see the Shoemaker chapter). We might also note that since it can be difficult for the 
privileged and powerful to put themselves in the shoes of the underprivileged – the poor, the 
disabled, or ethnic minorities, for example – relying on empathy in a political context may 
lead to reinforcing the unjust status quo. 
 With the notable exception of Michael Slote (2010), who thinks moral demands are 
as partial as empathy is, most partisans of empathy find these observations troubling. Alas, 
these concerns are not new. As already discussed, none other than David Hume himself was 
keenly aware of the biases and limitations of our empathy. We’ve seen that he believed we 
can, to some extent, correct for the inbuilt biases. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that 
empathy (“humanity”) can easily come into conflict with justice: 
When I relieve persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive; and so far as 
my succour extends, so far have I promoted the happiness of my fellow-creatures. 
But if we examine all the questions, that come before any tribunal of justice, we shall 
find, that, considering each case apart, it wou’d as often be an instance of humanity 
to decide contrary to the laws of justice as conformable to them. Judges take from a 
poor man to give to a rich; they bestow on the dissolute the labour of the industrious; 
and put into the hands of the vicious the means of harming both themselves and 
others. (T 155) 
So far, Hume is in agreement with critics like Bloom. But he digs deeper. Hume believes 
that justice is an “artificial virtue”, a system of rules that has arisen, because it serves, on the 
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whole, each individual’s enlightened self-interest. But why should we think that serving not 
just our own interest but the interests of all (or at least most) others is good or just? Hume’s 
answer is that it’s because we empathize with those others, and thus disinterestedly approve 
of justice and other artificial virtues. Given his view of the nature of empathy, Hume thought 
this would result in endorsing a kind of rule-utilitarianism. Adam Smith, in contrast, held 
that since we might empathize with the resentment of one person sacrificed for the benefit of 
many even if we’re impartial, empathy-based rules are non-consequentialist.  
Either way, such indirect empathy is arguably a good thing, when it comes to settling 
on principles of justice – someone who lacked such empathy might end up endorsing rules 
that fail to serve the general good, or show insufficient regard for the dignity of each 
individual. Consider someone like Adolf Eichmann, who possibly quite sincerely thought 
that morality required him to do his duty as defined by his superiors (Arendt 1963). It is safe 
to assume that had he reflected on the rules he was told to obey by placing himself of in the 
position any one of those negatively affected them, he wouldn’t have been equally 
enthusiastic about obedience to Nazi authorities. After all, empathy, in particular when it is 
regulated by reference to an ideal of impartiality, tends to result in embracing pro-social 
norms of the kind that most of us regard as correct (cf. Hoffman 2011). 
 So, philosophers who think empathy is a good thing for morality have always been 
aware that our natural tendency to take on other people’s feelings is an unreliable guide in 
moral judgment. Instead, they have argued that empathy must be tempered by regulating our 
emotional responses to particular cases so that we won’t miss the big picture. Nevertheless, 
they maintain that the alleged conflict between empathy and justice is illusory, since our 
regard for justice demands itself stems from empathy. They would thus agree that we 
shouldn’t base decisions about immigration policy on how we feel when contemplating a 
dead boy, for example. Untutored empathy can blind us to the non-actual and the wider 
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context. But it can spur us to reflect on what the alternatives to the actual situation are, and 
to consider their impact in the light of principles that may get their grip on us in virtue of 
resonating with impartially empathic responses. 
 
4. Conclusion 
It is likely an exaggeration to claim that empathy is the “cement of the moral universe”, as 
Michael Slote (2010) does. It is not plausible that empathy is either causally or constitutively 
involved in each and every moral judgment, and it may not be necessary for having the 
capacity to distinguish moral from other norms. But people who lack the ability to put 
themselves in the place of others and feel for them do appear to have trouble with moral 
insight and appreciating the grounds of pro-social moral principles, even if their rational 
powers are largely intact. This suggests that empathy may have an irreplaceable role in the 
development of good moral judgment after all, although it wouldn’t be wise to rely on it in 
each individual case. 
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